Measuring pricing bias in mortgages by Stanley D. Longhofer
W hether lenders discriminate against
minority applicants is a long-standing
question that has vexed regulators,
bankers, and policymakers alike. The
debate over this issue was fueled in the
early 1990s by the findings of the so-
called Boston Fed Study, which found
that minority applicants in Boston were
roughly 40 percent more likely to be
rejected for mortgage loans than simi-
larly situated whites.1 In the wake of this
study, examiners at the Federal Reserve
and other bank regulators began using
advanced statistical techniques to help
evaluate whether minority applicants
face discrimination in home lending. 
In recent years, the focus of fair-lending
enforcement has expanded to include the
pricing of mortgage credit. Thus, in
addition to investigating whether
lenders’ underwriting decisions are
affected by an applicant’s race or ethnic
status, regulators also try to determine
whether minorities pay higher interest
rates and fees for mortgages once they
are approved. Although such an investi-
gation sounds straightforward, measur-
ing discrimination in the pricing of mort-
gage loans is complicated by the fact
that mortgages are typically priced along
two dimensions—the interest rate and
up-front fees (or “points”)—which may
be traded off against each other. As a
result, it can be difficult in practice to
compare the total price charged to two
different borrowers. 
This Economic Commentary highlights
some of the complications this structure
creates when comparing the prices
charged different borrowers and dis-
cusses two ways of making various loans
comparable: “overages” and the “annual
percentage rate.” Although it is some-
times used in fair-lending investigations,
the annual percentage rate has inherent
flaws that make it a poor tool for detect-
ing and measuring discrimination in the
pricing of mortgage loans. In contrast,
such problems do not exist with over-
ages, making this measure a better tool
for evaluating fair-lending compliance. 
n n Mortgage Loan Pricing
Mortgage loans are priced along two
dimensions. The first is the loan’s nomi-
nal interest rate. The second is the up-
front fees, or points, that borrowers typi-
cally pay at the time the loan is closed. A
point, which is equal to 1 percent of the
loan amount ($1,000 on a $100,000
loan), is generally categorized in one of
two ways. Origination points cover the
lender’s costs associated with originat-
ing the loan, but do not typically cover
ancillary services such as credit reports
and appraisals (additional processing
fees are usually charged to pay for these
services). Discount points, meanwhile,
are used to modify the interest rate paid
by the borrower. By paying discount
points at the time of closing, borrowers
are able to obtain lower nominal interest
rates on their loans.
Although most lenders charge a uniform
number of origination points to all bor-
rowers with a given loan product, the
number of discount points and the nomi-
nal interest rate charged on any particu-
lar loan is the result of negotiations
between the borrower and the loan offi-
cer who originates the mortgage. As a
baseline from which to begin these
negotiations, loan officers work from a
rate sheet, which details the number of
discount points the lender requires for
any given nominal interest rate, as well
as the length of lock, or commitment
period for that rate.2
It is important to know that many mort-
gage lenders—but by no means all—
permit their loan officers to deviate from
the rate sheet when negotiating the price
of the loan. As a result, the ultimate
“price” paid for a loan at a given lender
may differ among borrowers, depending
on their willingness to negotiate and the
skill with which they do so.
The pricing of mortgage loans is illus-
trated by the sample rate sheet in table 1.
The columns across the top indicate the
different time frames over which the
lender is willing to lock in a borrower’s
rate. For example, a 15-day lock means
that the promised interest rate is guaran-
teed as long as closing occurs within 15
days of the lock date. After that time,
borrowers may be required to renegoti-
ate the rate. Those who expect to close
their loans in a matter of a few days may
choose a relatively short lock in return
for a lower interest rate, while those who
require more time to close their loans
may request a 60-, 75-, or even 90-day
lock. Of course, borrowers may choose
to float their rate, waiting to lock until
just prior to closing. 
The rows down the first column give the
different interest rates the lender is will-
ing to offer. The cells in the table show
the minimum number of discount points
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ISSN 0428-1276required to obtain a given interest rate/
length of lock combination (the required
price). For example, in our sample sheet,
the lender is willing to guarantee a 7.25%
rate for 30 days with zero points. For the
borrower to “buy down” the rate to 6.5%
would require paying 2.75 points at the
time of closing. In contrast, if the bor-
rower were willing to pay 7.75%, this
lender would be willing to pay the bor-
rower up to 2.125 points for the same 30-
day lock; borrowers often use such funds
to pay closing costs and meet down-pay-
ment requirements. Negative points are
sometimes called premium pricing, since
investors will pay a premium to purchase
loans with interest rates above those pre-
vailing in the market.
An overage occurs when the total dis-
count and origination points paid by a
borrower exceed those required by the
lender to originate the loan (its standard
origination points plus the required dis-
count points as listed on the rate sheet).
Overaging is often used as a way to
compensate loan originators; the larger
the overage a loan officer negotiates on a
loan, the higher his commission. Over-
aging is also a method that lenders use to
adjust their prices to meet local competi-
tive and economic conditions, particu-
larly when they issue a common rate
sheet across several markets. It is worth
noting that underages (also called short-
ages) can also occur, in which case the
lender accepts fewer points at origina-
tion than it would ordinarily require;
such pricing may be necessary for a
lender to remain competitive or to build
market share in certain markets.
n n Comparing Prices: 
Overages in Action
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and
the Fair Housing Act effectively prohibit
lenders from charging borrowers differ-
ent prices for mortgage loans on the
basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, marital status, familial status,
handicap, or age.3  While this might
seem a straightforward prohibition, the
fact that mortgage loans are priced along
these two dimensions makes it difficult
for regulators and others involved in
fair-lending enforcement to compare the
ultimate prices different borrowers are
charged for their loans. For example,
how can we determine if a borrower
who pays 1 point with a rate of 7.25% is
paying more or less than another bor-
rower who receives a rate of 8% with no
up-front fees? To compare these loans,
we must convert this two-dimensional
price into a single number that can be
easily compared across borrowers. 
There are several ways around this prob-
lem, but the overage calculation intro-
duced above is the most natural and, it
turns out, the most useful method for
comparing prices across loans. The first
step in this process involves calculating
the overage paid by each borrower,
according to the following formula:
+ Total points charged borrower 
– Origination points required by lender
– Discount points stated on rate sheet 
– Closing costs paid by lender
= Overage
In essence, an overage is calculated by
adding up all the points the borrower
paid (as disclosed on the HUD-1 Settle-
ment Statement) and comparing it to the
total number of points the lender required
to originate the loan, given the prevailing
rate sheet on the day the borrower’s
interest rate was locked. In some cases, a
lender may agree to waive or pay some
of the borrower’s closing costs. Since
such credits constitute a reduction in a
borrower’s total out-of-pocket expenses,
we subtract their value to come up with a
final overage calculation.
Consider the following example. Table 2
shows the fees charged to two borrow-
ers, Ms. Wyatt and Mr. Larson, by a
hypothetical lender, Acme Mortgage.
Acme’s policy is to charge a 1-point
origination fee on its 30-year, fixed-rate
mortgages.4  Ms. Wyatt, anticipating that
she will live in her house for several
years without refinancing her mortgage,
agrees to pay 3 points to buy down her
nominal interest rate to 6.75%. In con-
trast, Mr. Larson chooses to pay a higher
nominal interest rate; in return, Acme
Mortgage agrees to credit $2,000 toward
Mr. Larson’s closing costs. 
Assuming Acme priced both of these
loans using the rate sheet in table 1 (with
a 45-day lock), we see that, although she
has a lower nominal interest rate than
Mr. Larson, Ms. Wyatt paid more for her
loan. Acme’s required price for a loan
with a 6.75% rate was only 2.5 points,
but Ms. Wyatt was charged 3.0 points—
a 50-basis-point overage. In contrast,
Mr. Larson’s loan was made at “par”
(with neither an overage nor a shortage). 
This example illustrates how overages
can be used to compare the prices paid
by different borrowers, making it possi-
ble to test for fair-lending compliance.
By comparing the frequency and magni-
tude of overages paid by similarly situ-
ated minority and white borrowers, regu-
lators can better determine whether or
not lenders have illegal racial disparities
in the pricing of their loans. Such inves-
tigations usually involve a statistical
comparison of the average overages
charged each group, controlling for other
factors that might legitimately affect the
size of overages, such as loan amount,
borrower education, and market condi-
tions.5  If, after controlling for these
alternative explanations for differential
Interest
rate, percent 15 Days 30 Days 45 Days 60 Days
8.00 –3.500 –3.375 –3.250 –3.125
7.75 –2.250 –2.125 –2.000 –1.875
7.50 –1.875 –1.750 –1.625 –1.500
7.25 –0.125 0.000 0.125 0.250
7.00 0.250 0.375 0.500 0.625
6.75 2.250 2.375 2.500 2.625
6.50 2.625 2.750 2.875 3.000
SOURCE: Adapted from an actual lender rate sheet.
TABLE 1 SAMPLE RATE SHEET
Ms. Wyatt Mr. Larson
Loan amount $100,000 $100,000
Origination points 1.0 1.0
Discount points 3.0 –2.0
Nominal interest rate 6.75% 7.75%
Overage in points 0.50 0.00
Other processing fees $1,000 $1,000
Total up-front fees $5,000 $0
APR 7.26% 7.75%
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
TABLE 2 COMPARING THE PRICES OF TWO LOANSoverages across groups, a statistically
and economically significant price dis-
parity remains, a prima facie case of ille-
gal discrimination would exist. 
n n What About the APR?
Measuring pricing disparities using
overages essentially involves converting
the nominal interest rate a borrower pays
into up-front fees, or the number of
points required to originate the loan.
Alternatively, one could imagine making
the opposite conversion, calculating the
effective interest rate implied by a given
set of up-front fees. This is exactly the
idea behind the annual percentage rate
(APR) that must be disclosed under the
Truth in Lending Act.6
At first blush, the APR would seem a
straightforward way to compare prices
across mortgage loans and hence be a
reasonable tool for regulators evaluating
fair-lending compliance. Given that the
APR must be calculated and disclosed on
all loans, it would appear to be a low-cost
tool as well. In fact, a calculation similar
to the APR has been used in conjunction
with overages in several high-profile
anti-discrimination settlements, including
the well-publicized Long Beach case in
1996 and the more recent settlement by
Roslyn Bancorp. Unfortunately, the APR
has certain fundamental flaws that make
it a potentially misleading measure of
pricing bias in mortgage lending. 
The APR’s essential problem is that it
assumes all borrowers will hold their
loans to maturity. In other words, APR-
like price measures necessarily assume
that every borrower expects to continue
making mortgage payments for the same
length of time. The very fact that some
borrowers choose to “buy down” their
rate by paying discount points, however,
implies that this assumption is invalid.
Indeed, standard consumer guides advise
that borrowers who anticipate holding
their mortgage for more than four or five
years should consider paying discount
points to reduce their interest rate, while
those who anticipate moving or refi-
nancing their mortgage soon should not.
Unlike the overage calculation described
earlier, the APR cannot account for such
differences in borrower preferences
regarding the rate/point tradeoff.7
To see this problem more starkly, con-
sider again the example in table 2. As-
suming that, in addition to discount and
origination points, Acme charges bor-
rowers $1,000 in processing fees, Ms.
Wyatt’s total out-of-pocket expense for
her mortgage will be $5,000 (3 discount
points, 1 origination point, and $1,000 in
processing fees), giving her an APR of
7.26%. In contrast, Mr. Larson’s up-
front expenses are zero because of the
closing-cost credit from Acme. Thus, his
APR is 7.75%, almost 50 basis points
higher than Ms. Wyatt’s.
This difference in APRs, however, is
extremely misleading, since both bor-
rowers were asked to pay exactly the
same origination points and processing
fees. That is, Mr. Larson presumably had
the option of paying additional discount
points in return for a lower interest rate,
but he chose not to do so, either because
he had fewer liquid assets with which to
pay his closing costs or because he antic-
ipated paying off his mortgage in the
near future.8  As a result, focusing on the
APR could lead regulators to mistakenly
conclude that Mr. Larson unfairly paid
more for his mortgage, when in fact he
demonstrably preferred his loan to the
one obtained by Ms. Wyatt. Indeed, as
we showed above, it is Ms. Wyatt who
paid the higher price. Thus, focusing on
the APR not only can lead to the false
conclusion that a non-biased lender dis-
criminates, but it can also mask actual
disparities that do exist. 
This example becomes even more trou-
bling when we consider the possibility
that the choice of mortgage terms may
be directly affected by an applicant’s
financial condition, which in turn may
be correlated with race. In the above
example, Mr. Larson may well have
chosen his higher-rate loan precisely be-
cause he did not have (or did not want to
spend) the $5,000 in up-front expenses
associated with Ms. Wyatt’s loan. As a
consequence, the higher APR paid by
liquidity-constrained borrowers (those
with less cash available to close their
loans) may often be in their best inter-
est. Given the fact that minority mort-
gage applicants typically have fewer
liquid assets than their white counter-
parts, using the APR as a measure of
mortgage pricing could lead to system-
atic errors when attempting to detect
discrimination.9
An alternative way of understanding 
the problem with using APRs for fair-
lending compliance comes from noting
that many lenders do not permit their
loan officers to deviate from their rate
sheets (i.e., they do not permit over-
ages). At such lenders, the only possible
difference in APRs across loans arises
from borrower choices. To conclude that
such a bank was illegally discriminating
would clearly be a mistake, but using
APRs could easily imply just such a con-
clusion. If APRs can make a bank that
prohibits overaging appear discrimina-
tory, it could make such a mistake about
banks that permit overaging as well.
It is important to note that this problem
with the APR is present under any effec-
tive interest rate calculation using a com-
mon holding-period assumption for all
borrowers. The APR measures used in
the Long Beach and Roslyn investiga-
tions were calculated in several ways,
using a variety of assumptions about
anticipated holding periods. Although
such recalculations of the APR can affect
the magnitude and statistical significance
of observed “disparities,” they cannot
correct for the fundamental problem
inherent in an interest-rate-based meas-
ure of mortgage pricing: Borrowers
choose different loan products based on
their own personal knowledge about how
long they are likely to hold their mort-
gages. As a result, any comparison of
“effective interest rates” will provide an
inherently unreliable measure of discrim-
ination in the pricing of mortgage loans.
n n Concluding Thoughts
Uncovering and eradicating discrimina-
tion in credit markets is an important
goal for federal and state bank regula-
tors. Unfortunately, determining what
constitutes discriminatory behavior is
often more difficult than it appears. 
This Economic Commentary has focused
on one problem with identifying dis-
crimination in the pricing of mortgage
loans. Although the APR might seem a
reasonable way to compare prices across
different loans, it does not consider the
choices borrowers voluntarily make
about the terms of their loans. As a
result, relying on the APR can lead to
inaccurate conclusions about the pres-
ence of discrimination. 
This analysis makes it clear that regula-
tors and others involved in fair-lending
enforcement should abandon the use of
the APR and similar effective-interest-
rate comparison tools. Instead, fair-
lending compliance should be measured
through statistical comparisons of the
relative frequency and magnitude of
overages across groups. Using overages,
regulators can get a clearer, more accu-
rate picture of the true options that were
available to different borrowers.n n Footnotes
1. See Alicia H. Munnell, Geoffrey M.B.
Tootell, Lynn E. Browne, and James
McEneaney, “Mortgage Lending in Boston:
Interpreting HMDA Data,” American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 86, no. 1 (March 1996),
pp. 25-53.
2.  Lenders update their rate sheets frequently,
typically each day. Generally, they set these
rate sheets based on the prices at which they
are able to sell packages of loans to the sec-
ondary market, as well as to encourage or dis-
courage specific rates so as to meet prior
commitments to sell blocks of loans with par-
ticular characteristics.
3.  This is not to say that lenders are prohib-
ited from discriminating on the basis of other,
non-protected characteristics. For example,
individuals with severe credit blemishes often
pay substantially more for their mortgages, a
practice that does not violate the law. 
4.  Borrowers must pay other closing costs as
well. In addition to the processing fees shown
in table 2, there are often title charges, per
diem interest, mortgage insurance premiums,
escrow reserves, and other expenses. 
5.  Throughout this analysis, I focus only on
loans that are of the same product type (e.g.,
30-year, fixed-rate, conventional loans).
Because the pricing of different product types
may be differentially affected by competitive
conditions and other market factors, one
should never attempt to draw any conclusions
about discrimination from an analysis that
combines loans of multiple product types. 
6.  Very simply, the APR is derived by sub-
tracting the total up-front fees charged on a
loan (prepaid finance charges) from the origi-
nal principal balance to obtain the amount
financed. The APR is the interest rate that
would result in the borrower’s actual monthly
payment, if the true loan size were equal to
the amount financed; this can be calculated
using standard amortization formulas. 
7.  In an ideal world, regulators would like to
observe the entire set of rate/point options
made available to each borrower; such infor-
mation would provide a more complete pic-
ture of how a lender treats different groups.
Unfortunately, information such as this does
not exist. 
8. Another potential problem would arise if
Mr. Larson chose a longer lock-length than
Ms. Wyatt; under the APR, the higher inter-
est rate associated with this implicit “insur-
ance” would make it appear that Mr. Larson
was unfairly paying a higher price for his
mortgage. 
9. Evidence of this fact can be found in
Munnell et al., and the Federal Reserve’s
National Surveys of Consumer Finances.
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